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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

PROVO CITY CORPORATION
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)

Case No. 960512-CA
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Priority No. 2

vs.
MICHAEL R. ALLAN
Defendant/Appellant
SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdictional authority
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) of the Utah Code Annotated
(1953, as amended).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that Officer
Moore had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of defendant
Michael R. Allan's vehicle?
There are two standards of review, one to the factual
findings and the other to the conclusions of law.

"The trial

court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny
a motion to suppress are examined for clear error."

State v.

Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 76 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena.
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)).

" [T]he standard of review to

be applied to the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the facts as

1

found give rise to reasonable suspicion "is reviewable
nondeferentially for correctness . . . . '" Id. (quoting Pena, 869
P.2d at 939). "Nevertheless, the nature of this particular
determination of law allows the trial court "a measure of
discretion . . . when applying the standard to a given set of
facts.'" Id. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant Michael R. Allan was arrested March 27, 1995, and
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44, a Class B misdemeanor.
Defendant challenged the legality of the police officer's stop of
his vehicle, claiming that it constituted an unlawful search and
seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution in that the investigatory stop of his vehicle
was not supported by "reasonable suspicion."

On February 15,

1996, a Suppression Hearing was conducted before the Honorable
Ray M. Harding, Jr.
suppress.

Judge Harding denied defendant's motion to

On May 28, 1996, in a bench trial before Judge

Harding, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence.
2

Defendant was sentenced July 15, 1996, and on July 29, 1996,
defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District
Court.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On March 13, 1995, at approximately 7:20 P.m.. Provo City
Police Officer Brian Moore was on routine patrol in the downtown
area of Provo (R. 102). At that time he was dispatched to a
suspicious call in the Albertson's parking lot (Id.).

Officer

Moore was within four blocks of Albertson's and responded to the
call in close to a minute's time (R. 101). Dispatch indicated to
Officer Moore that someone on the pay phone at Albertson's was
"indicating that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and
they were concerned they were going to drive." (Id.)

The

informant had told dispatch that the suspect was "impaired
walking."

(R. 95) Such information was relayed to Officer Moore

(Id.).
When Officer Moore arrived at the parking lot, the
individual was still on the pay phone with dispatch (Id.).

The

individual got the officer's attention by waving his hands and
pointing (Id). As Officer Moore approached the informant, the
informant hung up the phone and came over towards the vehicle
(Id.).

He pointed, indicating that there was an individual

walking that had just gotten out of a red Camero and was
returning to the red Camero (R. 100-101).

The informant believed

that the man was intoxicated (R. 100). Officer Moore saw the red
3

Camero, it was the only one in the parking lot (id.) .

His

attention was drawn to the vehicle and he felt "like it was
extremely important to investigate instead of talking with the
individual any longer."

(Id.)

After talking with the officer,

the informant turned around and headed into Albertson's

(id.).

According to Officer Moore, "the parking lot was really
congested with people."

(R. 99) The congestion forced Officer

Moore "to go ahead and to drive back around through the parking
lot in order to come up with this vehicle, because it was about
four or five cars back."

(id.)

From the location of his police

car, the officer could not back up because of other vehicles
(id.).

At this point, when Officer Moore was close to

defendant's vehicle, he initiated a stop of the vehicle.

He

stated that he "had reasonable suspicion to believe that there
was possibly an intoxicated person there."

(id.)

The vehicle

had just started to back out of a parking stall when Officer
Moore operated his overhead lights to detain the vehicle (id.).
Officer Moore approached the vehicle and from the plain
smell of alcohol about the person of the driver was justified to
continue investigating and subsequently had probable cause to
arrest the driver for driving under the influence.
was identified as defendant Michael R. Allan.

The driver

Subsequent testing

confirmed defendant's blood alcohol level to be above that
allowed by law for an operator of a vehicle.
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SUMMARY OF THE SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
In the case Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah App. 1997) that the Utah Court of Appeals handed down after
the filing of the briefs in the case at bar, this Court found
reasonable suspicion existed for an officer to stop a drunk
driver based on information provided by a citizen-informant.
Further, this Court in Mulcahy outlined steps for determining
whether an officer has reasonable suspicion for making an
investigatory stop for drunk driving when the information is
provided by an informant.
Mulcahy is controlling in the case at bar.

This Court found

in that case that if an officer confirms facts given by an
informant, the officer does not have to wait until the suspect
endangers the public by actually driving before the officer may
make an investigatory stop

SUPPLEMENT TO THE ARGUMENT ALREADY PRESENTED
MULCAHY IS CONTROLLING IN THE CASE AT BAR AND AS
APPLIED BY THIS COURT OFFICER MOORE HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
Since the filing of Appellee's brief in the matter of Provo
City Corporation v. Michael R. AllanA 960512-CA (1997), a
decision from the Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has come
down and is on point with respect to the facts and issues at bar.
In Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 321 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App.
1997) the appellate court decided, inter alia, that a police
officer may rely on information from a dispatcher which was
5

obtained from a citizen informant to make a stop.
The Court of Appeals held that reasonable suspicion exists,
thereby justifying a stop, when an officer receives information
which is corroborated by the officer.

The Court in Mulcahy

articulated a three step process for determining articulable
suspicion.
involved.

The first step is to determine the type of the tip
The Court quoted State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257

(Utah Ct. App. 1992) ""[N]ot all tips are of equal value in
establishing reasonable suspicion.1" The Court noted that
anonymous tips are toward the "low-end of the reliability scale."
Id.

An anonymous tip, however, does not prevent a reasonable

officer from making a stop based on the tip.
The second step the Court identified is whether the
informant "gave enough detail about the observed criminal
activity to support a stop."

Id.

The Court of Appeals stated,

"A tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant
observed the details personally, instead of simply relying on
information from a third party."

Xd.

Giving an example from

Roth to illustrate this point the Court of Appeals said "For
instance, the informant in Roth gave enough detail in reporting
"the existence of a drunk driver along with a description of the
driver's vehicle, license number, and location.'" Id,
The final step which the Court identified is "whether the
police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's
report of the informant's tip."

id.

The Court stated that ""The

officer may corroborate the tip either by observing the illegal
6

activity or by finding the person, the vehicle and the location
substantially as described by the informant."

Mulcahy (quoting

from State v. Bybee, 884 P.2d 906, 908 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
In a situation that involves a potential drunk driver the
Court of Appeals specifically stated that "Certainly, "officers
are encouraged to investigate the suspect immediately, rather
than to allow the suspect to drive so that the officer may
observe the driving.

Otherwise, the risk that the suspect will

be involved in an accident increases, which is not in the
public's interest.'" Id. (quoting from Playle v. Commissioner of
Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)).
The Mulcahy case in controlling in the case at bar.

In

Allan the defendant was observed by a citizen who called police
dispatch with information that the defendant's walking was
impaired, appeared to be drunk and was preparing to get into his
car.

A police officer was less than a minute away from the scene

and upon arriving the informant, who was still on the phone with
dispatch at this time, physically pointed to the defendant and
his red Camero.

Although dispatch and the police officer were

unable to locate the informant after the officer initiated the
stop, the fact that the informant sufficiently described the
defendant and his vehicle by physically pointing them out to the
police officer satisfies the requirements set forth in Mulcahy
for reasonable suspicion.

Further, in accordance with Mulcahy

the police officer was not required to wait until the defendant
posed a public danger by allowing him to operate his vehicle
7

before initiating a stop.

The information received from dispatch

regarding a person who was apparently inebriated was subsequently
confirmed by the informant identifying the suspect.

This,

coupled with the public's interest in not having a potentially
drunk driver on the streets, gave the officer the requisite
reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful stop which led to the
arrest of the defendant.

CONCLUSION
Based on the argument above, Officer Moore's investigative
stop of defendant Michael R. Allan's vehicle was supported and
justified by reasonable suspicion based on specific and
articulable facts.

Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial

court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and uphold
defendant's conviction for Driving Under the Influence.
Dated this

^'

day of August, 1997.
l/C^^yu^^^ <tZ

VERNON F. ROMNEY
Attorney for Plaiihtdff-Appellee
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